So ended my first two weeks in Arusha.
'When we walk out; what was it all about?' a prosecution lawyer once asked, posing the question as much to himself as to me. The comments above demonstrate that those who worked at the ICTR answered that question in diverse ways. In contrast to this diversity, the Registrar of the Tribunal (Dieng 2003: 1) , wrote in the first edition of the 'ICTR Newsletter' in 2003:
As you all know, the Tribunal is striving to effectively discharge its mandate of trying persons accused of being responsible for genocide and other serious violations of humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994 . By so doing, the Tribunal is playing an effective role in promoting international peace and security and putting to an end such crimes. The Tribunal is also sending a strong message, regionally and internationally, that the international community is determined to put to an end the culture of impunity, which is a hallmark of such crimes. Also, by discharging its mandate, the Tribunal is contributing to the national reconciliation and unity in Rwanda. Unfortunately, little is known about how the daily activities of the ICTR are conducted.
On one hand, this statement reflects positions noted in the introduction to this special issue, that as one of a number of transitional justice interventions in Africa, the ICTR was an exceptional response to the 1994 genocide and, as such, marked a 'new beginning' internationally, regionally and nationally as it tried to terminate an abiding 'culture of impunity ' . And yet, the reference to hidden 'daily activities' raises questions about how those immersed in the quotidian activities of international criminal justice related to the Tribunal's purported exceptionality and as a 'new beginning'. As indicated in the opening section, assessments were diverse and nuanced.
Recent scholarship has emphasised the need to attend to the way in which the supposedly universal mechanisms of 'transitional justice' are 'localised' (see Shaw, Waldorf, Hazan 2010) . As a consequence of this research, scholars have argued that transitional justice institutions, including international tribunals, should be more attuned to the specificities of the contexts in which they operate (see Betts 2005) . This emphasis on the localisation of 'transitional justice' has concentrated on the affected 'locals' and has, on the whole, not concerned itself with those who work for these institutions (Baylis 2008: 364) . When they are considered, they tend to be homogenised. Tshepo Madlingozi (2010: 225) , for example, speaks of 'transitional justice entrepreneurs' whom he describes as 'A well-travelled international cadre of actors [who] theorize the field; set the agenda; legitimize what constitute appropriate transitional justice norms and mechanisms '. Kieran McEvoy (2007: 424-426) similarly states of transitional justice institutions that 'actors within such institutions develop a self-image of serving higher goals' and notes 'the tendency of international lawyers to eulogize the glory and majesty of international law'. However, in her critique of the 'rule of law' aspect of 'transitional justice' discourses, Kamari Clarke (Clark 2009: 64) says of the 'cosmopolitan elite' that implements international criminal justice that the 'interests that tie these individuals to their elite enterprise are varied -shaped by professional ambitions, corporate economic interests, a personal desire for travel, idealistic aspirations for world peace, a commitment to the moral project of human rights through rule of law mechanisms, or a combination of these'. I certainly encountered this diversity at the ICTR.
The specific sites occupied by this diverse group in which their varied interests are played out must also be recognised as localities, that there is no such place as the 'international' divorced from the messiness of quotidian practice. As I have argued elsewhere (Eltringham 2010:208) international tribunals must be seen as sites of local 'vernacularisation' (see Merry 2006) , where assumptions and claims regarding 'transitional justice' are mediated, appropriated, translated, modified, misunderstood or ignored by (cosmopolitan) 'locals' just as they are in the villages of Sierra Leone (Shaw 2007) ; of East Timor (Kent 2011 ) or Bosnia (Mannergren Selomivic 2010 . This article, therefore, explores the messy realities of the ICTR as experienced by the (cosmopolitan) locals who worked there, who both invoked and challenged official claims that the ICTR was an exceptional response that marked a 'new beginning'. The article will gain entry to these divergent opinions by focusing on the lack of indictments of members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army for alleged massacres in Rwanda in 1994. First, following a brief introduction to the Tribunal, the article considers the claim that the Tribunal marked a 'new beginning'. Assessments of the ICTR by lawyers and judges are then explored through the accusations that the Tribunal enacted 'Victor's Justice'. All quotes are taken from interviews conducted in Arusha, 2005 Arusha, -2007 
Context
Between 7 April and mid-July 1994 an estimated 937,000 Rwandans, the vast majority of who were Tutsi, were murdered in massacres committed by militia, the gendarmerie and elements of the army, often with the participation of the local population (see Des Forges 1999; Eltringham 2004; IRIN 2001 Rights on the situation of human rights in Rwanda (Degni-Ségui 1994: 19) . The UN Security
Council Resolution (UN 1994e), initially sponsored by the United States and New Zealand, contains four purposes for the ICTR: to bring to justice those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law (referring to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes); to 'contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace'; and to halt violations of international humanitarian law (deterrence).
Trials began in 1996 and lasted an average of four years (one has lasted nine years) (GADH 2009a: 76) .
2 None of those interviewed are Rwandan. There have been no Rwandan judges at the ICTR and no Rwandan defence lawyers. Rwandans have acted as investigators for defence teams; as interpreters; and in witness protection. 3 Rwanda voted against the Security Council resolution because it believed the temporal jurisdiction should have been broader (from 1990-1994) ; that the ICTR should have had its own prosecutor and appeals chamber; that the judges should have had recourse to the death penalty; and that the tribunal should have been located in Rwanda (UN 1994f: 13-16 and that 'It was not something I wanted to do'.
The apparent lack of a priori investment or experience in the project of international criminal justice means that lawyers and judges lacked a priori expectations. The assessment of international criminal justice they held when I spoke to them, while not pre-determined by the institutional location they occupied, was forged by the specific power(lessness) that accompanied their institutional location whether judiciary, prosecution or defence. As noted in the opening section, judges have the power to judge, but they cannot choose who is indicted; defence lawyers have the power to 'preserve history', but they consider the ICTR to be a 'Victor's Court'. As a consequence of these different institutional locations and the relative power individuals possess, the claims that the ICTR marks a 'new beginning' was interpreted in different ways. As will be discussed below, some who worked at the Tribunal deterrence) and some do not (ending the 'culture of impunity'; jurisprudence). But, there is a third, tripartite, way in which these possibilities can be parsed; those that simply fulfil a formal fulfilment of the Tribunal as a court of law (number of arrests, completed trials); those that signal a 'new beginning' for Rwanda ('ending the "culture of impunity"'; national reconciliation; peace; deterrence) and those that signal a 'new beginning', not for Rwanda, but for the project of international criminal justice (jurisprudence).
I will consider two prosecution lawyers as an illustration of the different ways individuals related to these different possibilities. The prosecutor quoted at the start of the article invested in the Rwanda-specific promises of the Preamble ('we are making peace'). Within minutes, however, he told me, that the ICTR's 'legacy' was its global contribution to the 'new beginning' of the project of international criminal law:
We think of it as stitching together a fabric. The Tribunal, its law, its definitions of crimes, these are now all available to other institutions. This Tribunal has made an enormous contribution to the international legal regime. The Tribunal was not explicitly created for the purpose of knitting the fabric together, but these definitional achievements are consistent with that defining statute. We see our legacy as our jurisprudence.
For this prosecution lawyer, the legacy was straightforward; an 'enormous contribution to the international legal regime'. But, his use of the inclusive first person plural ('We see our legacy as our jurisprudence') is deceptive. Five days later I met with another prosecution lawyer. I began by asking him whether he thought that lawyers, on first arriving at the ICTR, believed it could achieve the promises of the claiming that 30,000 had been massacred; that the 'methodology and scale' suggested a 'plan implemented as a policy from the highest echelons of the government'; and that 'these were not individual cases of revenge and summary trials but a pre-planned, systematic genocide Commentators have persistently accused the ICTR of 'Victor's Justice' (see Reydams 2005; HRW 2002; HRW and FIDH 2006) and allegations against the RPF are part of the judicial record (as indicated by the references to trial exhibits above). 10 As a consequence, rather than a 'new beginning' for international criminal justice, the ICTR, it has been argued, was 'business as usual', marking a 'return to the Nuremberg paradigm of international criminal justice' (Reydams 2005: 981) , the paradigm of 'Victor's Justice'.
Hidden Views on 'Victor's Justice'
I found that the accusation of 'Victor's Justice' was a ubiquitous, if often private, concern among those with whom I spoke at the ICTR. Among the members of the Office of the Prosecutor, none dismissed allegations against the RPF, a number were adamant that there should be RPF indictments, while others argued that the genocide, as the 'major crime base', must remain the priority to ensure the rights of defendants who had been in custody for up to ten years. When, for example, I asked a prosecution lawyer whether he was concerned about the accusations of 'victor's justice', he replied:
We are required to investigate RPF crimes because they are under our jurisdiction. But, it needs to be approached diplomatically. We are accused of 'victor's justice', but, our major crime base is the genocide. We still have people in detention awaiting trial. This must be the priority. How can we take on new cases when people have been in detention propelled by a sincere commitment to the rights of the accused or because infractions of the accused's rights can disrupt the prosecution's case, prosecution lawyers were keenly aware that power of the Prosecutor was curtailed by the Rwandan government. Rather than a principled opposition to RPF indictments, this gave rise to a prevalent, pragmatic resignation.
As a prosecution lawyer, explained to me:
Like Nuremberg, we are accused of enacting 'victor's justice'. Given that the RPF committed atrocities, although not genocide, the fact that the Prosecutor is unable to provide justice for those from the other side of the conflict continues to haunt us. The dilemma we face is that the Rwandan government can disrupt our trials. When we close, that is one of the criticisms we will face. We cannot complete trials without the help of the RPF. We want international justice, but we cannot avoid dilemmas.
What I found surprising was defence lawyers' understanding of the prosecution's dilemma, This position among defence lawyers was that the Tribunal should be an unexceptional place in which politics (principally 'victor's justice') should be avoided in favour of technical 'business as usual'.
Those defence lawyers described as 'political' also considered the ICTR to be unexceptional, but for entirely different reasons. For them, as 'victor's justice', it amounted to 'business as usual' that could be traced back to Nuremberg. And yet, this was only one element of their complex evaluation of the ICTR. One defence lawyer (among those described as 'politically motivated' by colleagues) told me that that the ICTR was a 'political institution' and that 'It's just a bunch of white people condemning Africans to show what will happen if they do not tow the line'. The lawyer appealed to an 'alternative logic of the ordinary' in seeing a 'neo-colonial agenda ... behind the rhetoric of exception' and a 'new beginning' (see Introduction) .
And yet, despite this denunciation, the lawyer still conceded that 'because the trials are adversarial it means that we can present to the public some reality in some small way, more and more stuff has come out'.
This position, that although the ICTR was a 'Victor' court' there were elements of the trials that were redeemable, was something I encountered with other defence lawyers. To return to the two defence lawyers quoted in the opening section. Although they described the ICTR as a 'victor's court' and 'a persecution of Hutus' they tempered their assessment by describing the trials as a mechanism to preserve history (see Eltringham 2009 ):
The accused persons say, and keep saying, we shouldn't give up. We are putting everything on record for history. The truth will come out one way or another. Put everything on the record and then later our children will decide on the truth. People will be able to read and make their own decisions in the future. We have all the records. The judgement is not made now; the judgement will be made in the future.
Like their colleague ('more and more stuff has come out') these defence lawyers saw trials as a mechanism to establish the 'true' history of the 1994 genocide. And yet, unlike their colleague, they did not reject the wider project of international criminal justice. Regarding the SCSL, for example, one of the two defence lawyers observed that 'In Sierra Leone, all the parties in the conflict were indicted'. Although condemning the ICTR as a 'victor's court' these defence lawyers also spoke of their clients' commitment to the trial; that the trial provided an opportunity for creating a 'record for history'; and that failures at the ICTR did not mean that the project of international criminal justice was universally moribund.
The idea that ICTR trials, whatever their shortcomings were redeemable as a mechanism to record 'history' was conveyed by other defence lawyers; that a client had told his lawyer 'We appreciate what you have done, that our children's children will know the truth, that truth was spoken and that truth cannot be hidden forever' while another defence lawyer observed that the 'semblance of an equality of arms' enabled the disclosure and publication of documents related to alleged RPF crimes, an opportunity to tell 'the untold story of the Rwanda War'. (Bourdieu 1987: 851) and deferring to an immutable text that assigns roles and power, the judge was making clear to me that while judges must approve an indictment prepared by the prosecution (UN 1994e: Art 18(1)), they cannot order the indictment of anyone or review the Prosecutor's decision not to indict someone who has been investigated.
Unprompted, he continued:
Selective prosecution has been a judicial question, that we only prosecute Hutu people when Tutsi people also committed crimes against humanity … you know, this idea of 'victor's justice' that has been around since Nuremberg and that it is no different here. I, from a judicial point of view, I would not describe it as this, but judiciary are not involved in the selection of who to prosecute.
It is worthy of note that it was the judge who introduced the issue of 'victor's justice' and the 'business as usual' reference back to Nuremberg. In this light, his initial emphasis on the independence of the judiciary and reference to the Statute suggests 'victor's justice' is a constant accusation from which the judge was seeking to pre-emptively insulate himself.
12 For the prosecution's stated criteria for prosecution see (ICTR 2004b were RPF and everyone, including judges, were shocked when they discovered they weren't'.
In a similar vein another ALO told me (also in 2007) that 'Up until four months ago everyone thought they were the RPF, that at the eleventh hour they were finally going to put things right. I think some of the judges were convinced they were and were disappointed'.
While judges impressed on me that that they were not responsible for who was indicted ('the prosecutor exercises independent judgement') or that the allegations against members of the RPF had been acknowledged as far as was possible ('There are small contributions here and there') reports from ALOs that judges hoped the Prosecutor would 'put things right' and that judges were 'shocked' and disappointed' when this did not happen suggests that judges fear such considerations will not insulate them from criticism of the ICTR in the longue durée.
This would appear all the more likely given that detractors already criticise 'The Tribunal'
(rather than the Prosecutor) for failing to indict the RPF (HRW 2009).
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the ICTR has been promoted by its spokespersons as a 'new beginning', an exceptional, temporary ad hoc response that will dismantle a long-standing 'culture of impunity'. The current critique of transitional justice suggests that it is to Rwanda that one should look to assess this promise. Surveys conducted in Rwanda, however, suggest that Rwandans have very little knowledge of the institution (Longman et al. 2004) .
And yet, seeking affirmation or rejection of the ICTR solely in Rwanda would obscure another site of assessment. As noted, the current critique of transitional justice tends to portray the 'local' as a place of endless colourful variation in which the hopelessly simplistic prescriptions and logics of international criminal justice and human rights are bound to come unstuck. Such an analysis tends to portray 'transitional justice' as a disembodied, unified set of discourses and related practices. The analysis above, however, demonstrates that unanimity within transitional justice (even within a single organ of the Tribunal such as the prosecution) is illusory and we must attend to an interstitial locality: the transitional justice institution itself and those who inhabit it.
One of the obstacles to such exploration is that those who speak on behalf of transitional justice institutions actively promote a notion of unanimity and unity (see Baylis 2008:368) .
For example, discussing the choice of those who have been indicted, the Tribunal's registrar has written 'The Tribunal has followed a thematic and geographical approach to its work based on the patterns of involvement of leading individuals in several sectors of societypoliticians, military, civil administrators, media, and clergy -and the locations of the crimes alleged' (Dieng 2001) . It is not, however, 'The Tribunal' that has followed this approach, but the Prosecutor, for it is neither the registrar, the judges nor, obviously, defence lawyers who choose who is indicted. As the judge forcefully corrected me when I asked him why has the Tribunal chosen to indict certain people: 'The decision to prosecute is made by the Prosecutor without any influence. Therefore, it is not "the Tribunal" which selects the accused'. In another example, the former spokesman of the ICTR writes 'When the Tribunal's judges handed down two path-breaking judgments in late 1998 … the Tribunal regained its confidence in full' (Moghalu 2005: 66) . Such a statement also collapses the discrete organs and associated power designated by the Tribunal's statute. By designating 'independent' organs 'The Chambers' (judges); 'The Prosecutor'; 'registry'; and defence lawyers, the 1994
Statute (Nations 1994e: Art 10 20) assigns and circumscribes power. It is this differentiation, combined with the diverse biographies of lawyers and judges, that generates the diverse, messy perspectives that have been the subject of this article.
By attending to hidden views generated by this system of relations one can begin a 'public engagement with powerful institutions whose knowledge systems constantly organize attention away from the contradictions and contingencies of practice and the plurality of perspectives' (Mosse 2006:938 
